Sanjukta Paul

Sanjukta Paul

Assistant Professor of Law

Contact

Room 3255
(313) 577-3952

Sanjukta Paul

  • Biography

    Sanjukta Paul joined Wayne State as an assistant professor in fall 2017. She is writing a book tentatively entitled "Solidarity in the Shadow of Antitrust: Labor & the Legal Idea of Competition," which will be published by Cambridge University Press.

    Her academic work has appeared or is forthcoming in, among others, the UCLA Law Review; Law & Contemporary Problems; the Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law; and The Cambridge Handbook of U.S. Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century. Her paper “The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action” was recognized with the Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund's award for the best antitrust scholarship of 2016 (category prize). She has also written about her research and other topics in her areas of study for broader audiences, recently including The American Prospect, Aeon, Law & Political Economy (blog), and On Labor (blog).

    Paul previously served as David J. Epstein Fellow in Public Interest Law & Policy at UCLA Law School. There she designed and taught the Workers Rights Litigation Clinic, which represented low-wage workers. She was a public interest attorney in Los Angeles for several years, representing workers in litigation as well as working on a labor organizing campaign.

    Paul clerked for the Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and is a graduate of Yale Law School, where she was a Coker Fellow.

  • Degrees and Certifications

    B.A., University of Iowa
    M.A. (Philosophy), University of Pittsburgh
    J.D., Yale Law School

  • Courses Taught

    Corporations, Labor Law, Advanced Topics in Work Law (dealing mainly with corporate & antitrust law from workers' perspective), Employment Law

  • Social Science Research Network
    View SSRN Profile

    Publications

    • New: The Firm Exemption and the Hierarchy of Finance in the Gig Economy
      July 30, 2019
      Worker-owned or controlled firms face a little-studied threat from antitrust law that typifies much broader problems with the current antitrust paradigm, namely that it favors coordination through concentrated ownership and control while disfavoring coordination through democratic participation, for example by workers. Our existing system for provisioning credit reinforces, at multiple levels, antitrust’s criteria for allocating economic coordination rights. The so-called gig economy illustrates these problems especially acutely. Incorporation by workers, producers, or service-providers is not—without structural reforms—a solution to the antitrust paradoxes created by the gig economy. We show that a firm created and controlled by ride-share drivers or other individual service-providers would have difficulty qualifying for antitrust’s firm exemption under existing law. More, this differential legal obstacle is exacerbated by the hierarchy of finance. In contrast to dominant firms, ...
    • REVISION: Fissuring and the Firm Exemption
      May 16, 2019
      Workers beyond the bounds of employment and other small players are deprived of coordination rights under "fissured" business arrangements in addition to being subject to the control of relatively large, powerful firms. This absence of coordination rights is neither an inexorable force of nature as the 'economy changes' nor is it a free-standing legal fact. Rather, the conditions under which workers and small enterprises are deprived of coordination rights in these business arrangements are instead part of an overall allocation of coordination rights that is a fundamental function of antitrust law. Antitrust law affirmatively chooses hierarchy and domination, as embodied in the traditional firm and as extended under contemporary firm fissuring, as its preferred form of coordination while condemning cooperation. Barred from joint price-setting or joint bargaining themselves, workers and small firms are effectively forced to pay more powerful firms for the benefit of their license to ...
    • REVISION: Fissuring and the Firm Exemption
      April 24, 2019
      Workers beyond the bounds of employment and other small players are deprived of coordination rights under “fissured" business arrangements in addition to being subject to the control of relatively large, powerful firms. This absence of coordination rights is neither an inexorable force of nature as the 'economy changes' nor is it a free-standing legal fact. Rather, the conditions under which workers and small enterprises are deprived of coordination rights in these business arrangements are instead part of an overall allocation of coordination rights that is a fundamental function of antitrust law. Antitrust law affirmatively chooses hierarchy and domination, as embodied in the traditional firm and as extended under contemporary firm fissuring, as its preferred form of coordination while condemning cooperation. Barred from joint price-setting or joint bargaining themselves, workers and small firms are effectively forced to pay more powerful firms for the benefit of their license to ...

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